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Abstract 
 
Multilevel Flow Modeling (MFM) model maps functionality of components in a system 
through logical interconnections and is effective in predicting success rates of tasks 
undertaken. However, the output of this model is binary, which is taken at its extrema, i.e., 
success and failure, while in reality, the operational status of plant components often spans 
between these end. In this paper, a multi-state model is proposed by adding probabilistic 
information to the modelling framework. Using a heat exchanger pilot plant as a case 
study, the MFM model is transformed into its fault tree [1] equivalent to incorporate failure 
probability information. To facilitate computations, the FT model is transformed into 
Bayesian Network model, and applied for fault detection and diagnosis problems. The 
results obtained illustrate the effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed method. 
 
Keywords: Functional modeling, multi–state system, multilevel flow modeling, fault tree 
analysis, Bayesian network. 
 
Abstrak 
 
Model Permodelan Pelbagai Aras (MFM) memetakan fungsi-fungsi komponen-komponen 
dalam sistem secara logical dan ianya berkesan dalam meramal kadar kejayaan tugas 
yang dilaksanakan. Walau bagaimanapun, keluaran dari model ini adalah binari dengan 
nilai yang diambil pada titik ekstrema, iaitu sama ada berjaya atau gagal, sedangkan 
pada keadaan sebenar, status operasi komponen loji sering menjangkau titik-titik di antara 
kedua ekstrema tersebut. Dalam artikel ini, model pelbagai keadaan dicadangkan 
dengan menambah maklumat kebarangkalian kepada rangka kerja model. Dengan 
menggunakan loji perintis penukar haba sebagai kajian kes, model MFM itu ditukar 
menjadi model yang setara dalam format pokok gagal [1] yang menggabungkan 
maklumat kebarangkalian kegagalan. Untuk memudahkan pengiraan, model FT itu 
diubah kepada format model rangkaian Bayesian, dan digunakan untuk permasalahan 
pengesanan dan diagnosis kerosakan. Keputusan yang diperolehi menggambarkan 
keberkesanan dan kesesuaian kaedah yang dicadangkan. 
  
Kata kunci: Pemodelan berasaskan berfungsi, sistem pelbagai keadaan, model aliran 
pelbagai aras, analisis pokok gagal, rangkaian Bayesian. 
 
© 2016 Penerbit UTM Press. All rights reserved 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
Multilevel Flow Modelling (MFM) is a functional 
modelling technique with high level of abstraction, and 
belongs to a class of artificial intelligence research 
called qualitative reasoning [2]. The relationship 
between functions and the objective or main goal of 
the system in MFM model is determined by cause–
effect relationships, based on means–end relations to 
represent the process in multiple levels of functions [3]. 
The causal relations between the behaviour and the 
intention of the system components makes the MFM 
model suitable for system diagnosis [4], and attracts 
various applications. Petersen[5] used an MFM model 
for alarm analysis, risk monitoring systems and fault 
analysis, while Larsson[6] used MFM model to describe 
the target of the process for measurement validation, 
alarm analysis and fault diagnosis. 
Despite these encouraging reports, the 
conventional MFM model is not attractive for general 
use in chemical processes as it only provides binary 
outputs at its extrema. For applications in chemical 
processes, models that provide multiple states are more 
useful compared to those that describe the system and 
its components as (0, 1) and ignores their intermediate 
states [7, 8].  This has encouraged the development of 
modelling frameworks such as multi–state event tree 
and multi–state fault tree [9-11]. The idea of using multi–
state system in engineering was popularised by [12] by 
expressing the expected outcomes in terms of failure 
probabilities or frequencies. In this paper, this idea is 
adopted to extend the functionality of the MFM model 
for the purpose of fault detection and diagnosis. By 
converting the fault tree developed from the MFM 
model into Bayesian network, the desired analysis of 
multi–state system can be carried out using conditional 
probability distribution to represent the relationship 
between components states and system target.  
 
 
2.0  THE CAUSALITY SYSTEM IN MFM 
 
In this paper, causal dependency graphic (CDG) is 
used to represent the qualitative cause–consequences 
analysis between components in the MFM model. The 
states of the MFM flow functions are shown in table 1. 
Each function in the MFM model may only take some of 
these states. Besides, to guarantee success in achieving 
the main goal, each function must be in a normal state 
[13]. According to these states the CDG of system is 
constructed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 The states of flow functions in MFM 
 
 
Function  
 
Possible States 
 
Source Normal, high volume, low volume 
Sink  Normal, high volume, low volume 
Transport Normal, high flow, low flow* 
Storage Normal, high volume, low volume 
Barrier Normal, leak 
Balance Normal, fill, leak, unbalance 
Objective (goal) True, false** 
 
*No flow state is included as low flow state. **False state of an objective 
function in divided to two states, false results from the high state of 
functions (fault -1) while the consequences of the low state of functions 
is (Fault - 2). 
 
 
3.0   BAYESIAN NETWORK (BN) 
 
BN is a probabilistic graphical model that is based on 
directed acyclic graphs (DAG) with probability 
annotated. A node in a BN represents a random 
variable, and is linked with other variables with defined 
probabilistic dependencies. Using BN, qualitative and 
quantitative representation of the relations between 
variables can be established using prior and conditional 
probabilities of variables. Updates of these probabilities 
can be generated and used to represent different 
system probabilities. The “OR” gate in fault tree model 
is mapped to BN, and is equivalent to a series system, 
while the “AND” gate is equal to parallel system. By 
using BN, compactness of the model can be 
established by factoring the joint distribution into a 
local, conditional distribution for each variable given its 
parents. If xi denotes a value of the variable Xi and pai 
denotes some set of values for the parent of Xi, then P(xi 
| pai) denotes this conditional distribution. 
 
 
4.0  CASE STUDY: 
 
As a case study, a heat exchanger pilot plant system at 
Universiti Teknologi Malaysia normally used for studying 
heat exchange mechanisms and temperature control 
is examined. As illustrated in Figure 1, the plant consists 
of a heating medium tank (VE110), product tank 
(VE150), two pumps (P112, P152), heat exchanger 
(HX120), cooler (CL140), two heaters (HE110, HE111) 
and valves. Water is supplied to this plant from outside 
sources via hand valve HV100 and HV101 to the heating 
medium tank VE110 and product tank VE150 
respectively.  Then the water in VE110 is heated to 60 oC 
using heaters HE110 and HE111. The heated water is 
then pumped by P112 and water at room temperature 
is pumped by P152 to the heat exchanger HX120. 
Cooling water enters the product tank though the 
cooler CL140 if the temperature is above the target 
value. The main goal of this process plant is to maintain 
water temperature in tank VE150. 
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4.1 Multilevel Flow Modelling (MFM) for The Heat 
Exchanger Pilot Plant 
 
The heat exchanger pilot plant illustrated in Figure 1 is 
converted into the MFM model and is shown in Figure 2. 
Note that the control systems of the plant plays 
important role for plant operation and safety, but is not 
included in this study. This process has one goal (main 
goal) (Go0), which is to maintain water temperature in 
tank VE150, and five objectives (sub - goals) for more 
details (Khalil et al., 2016). In this plant, heat exchanger 
is the core of the system. It has two purposes, the main 
function is to transfer energy from the hot water to the 
cold water, and a secondary purpose to prevent mixing 
between hot and cold water via tube wall that 
represents in the model by barrier (Bar0). The heat 
exchange mechanism is represented by the balance 
function in the MFM model, Bal3 and Bal6 for cooling 
and heating water respectively for mass flow, and by 
Bal10 and Bal12 for energy flow structure (EFS0). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 The heat exchanger pilot plant [14] 
 
 
 
Figure 2  The MFM of the heat exchanger pilot plant [14] 
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4.2   Fault Tree of MFM 
 
Figure 3 shows the fault tree model that is mapped 
from MFM model to incorporate probabilistic 
information into the modelling framework. The FT 
model represents the relationship between events of 
the heat exchanger pilot plant, with the top event TE 
assumed to occur when a fault is occurring in only one 
component at any time. Note that in this analysis, the 
prior probability distributions of basic components are 
considered independent. 
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Figure 3 The FT of the MFM of the heat exchanger pilot plant [14] 
 
 
Note that in Figure 3, all gates are “Or”, reflecting that 
the components can be represented by a series 
system in the MFM model. TE represents the failure to 
maintain water temperature in tank VE150 at the 
desired set point. Since this is the main function of the 
plant, for the MFM model, it is considered as the main 
goal. The failure to satisfy this main goal may results 
from the failure in one or more intermediate gates, i.e., 
Bal0 (heat exchanger fails to functioning) which results 
from the failure in the tube or shell sides, Obj0 (failure 
to cool water), Obj1 (heat exchanger fails to heat a 
water), Obj2 (electrical failure to provide electricity to 
the pump 2), Obj3 (electrical failure to provide 
electricity to the pump 1), Obj4 (heater in tank V110 
fails to heat a water), Tra8 (pump 1 fails to transfer the 
cool water to the heat exchanger), Tra13 (pump 2 fails 
to transfer the water), Sou3 (failure to provide the 
system for the  cold water), Sou5 (failure to provide the 
system for the  hot water). All these will lead to the TE 
being false. The fault tree model of the system 
included only significant changes of plant states that 
are dependent on implicit assumptions about plant 
functions and operating conditions.  
In Figure 4, the causal dependency graphic (CDG) 
is constructed from the MFM model of the heat 
exchanger system according to the direct influence 
relationships between flow functions as illustrated in 
table 2. Due to lack of space in this paper, only the 
CDG for MFS0 is considered, and a low flow delivered 
by pump2 (tra13) is used as a simple example. This 
leads to an unbalance state in the heat exchanger 
(Bal5), which in turn causes a low flow state and an 
unbalance state in the pipeline (tra14) and cooler 
(Bal6) respectively. In Figure 4, the state within the 
square (tra13) represents the root cause; the thick 
arrows representing the consequences path; the 
dashed arrow representing causal path and the states 
within a double circles are the observed states 
(consequences) (Bal5 and Ba6). There would be three 
faults, one primary (root cause) fault in pump2 low 
flow and two consequential, unbalance state in heat 
exchanger and cooler. The CDG can be used to 
predict or diagnose the fault of functions by using 
relationships between the process faults and their 
causes and consequences.  
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Figure 4 The Causal Dependency Graph between functions of the MFM in Figure2. 
 
 
According to Table 1, the components are set in 
three states 0, 1, 2, where 0 is normal operation state, 
1 is a state of fault state 1(high or fill), 2 is fault state 2 
(low or leak). Unbalance state is included in the leak 
state in this study. The prior probability distributions of 
root nodes of the system shown in Table 3 are 
obtained by statistics and analysis of failure data of 
the elements of the system. 
 
Table 2 Direct influences relationships between flow functions in MFM model in Figure 2 
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Table 3 Prior probability distribution of root nodes of the system in Figure 3 
 
 
Component 
 
Flow 
Function 
 
Component State probability 
 
 
0 (Normal) 
 
1(High) 
 
2(Low) 
 
 
Pipeline 
 
Tra2 
 
0.9999934552 
 
6.48E-6 
 
6.48E-8 
 
Water tank Sin0 0.99983869 1.598E-4 1.512E-6 
 
Source S.S energy Sou0 0.99321220 6.48E-3 3.078E-4 
 
Cooler Bal3 0.98635790 1.296E-2 6.821E-4 
 
Cooling water source Sou3 0.999997 2.0E-6 1.0E-6 
 
Valve HV Tra7 0.97273 2.7E-2 2.7E-4 
 
Water tank Sto0 0.99983869 1.598E-4 1.512E-6 
 
Electricity supply Sou4 0.99561520 4.32E-3 6.48E-5 
 
Cord Tra11 0.99727160 2.592E-3 1.364E-4 
 
Pump1 mechanical Tra8 0.928720 4.536E-2 2.592E-2 
 
Source T.S energy Sou1 0.99999318 6.48E-6 3.41E-7 
 
Heating water source Sou5 0.9704420 2.808E-2 1.478E-3 
 
Valve HV Tra12 0.97273 2.7E-2 2.7E-4 
 
Tank Sto1 0.99983869 1.598E-4 1.512E-6 
 
Tube rupture Bar0 0.999993179 6.48E- 6 3.41E- 7 
 
Electricity supply Sou6 0.99561520 4.32E-3 6.48E-5 
 
Cord Tra16 0.99727160 2.592E-3 1.364E-4 
 
Pump2 mechanical Tra13 0.928720 4.536E-2 2.592E-2 
 
Heat transfer medium Tra6 0.99999996 3.7962E-8 1.998E-9 
 
Water heater elem. Sou2 0.970442 0.02808 0.001478 
 
 
 
5.0   RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
Based on the BN model of the heat exchanger, using 
the prior probability of components and the CPT of the 
top event (G0), and by applying accurate reasoning 
Bucket elimination algorithm [15] to calculate the 
probability, the probabilities are determined, giving 
value for the node G0, P(G0 = FAULT-1) = 0.0723,  P(G0 
= FAULT-2) = 0.1628, as shown in Figure 5. Note that in 
cases of no evidence, the probability of node G0 and 
intermediate nodes cannot be determined. 
Similarly, the posterior probability of each node 
can be deduced when the system is in completely 
fault-1 state (G0 (FAULT-1) = 1) or in case of completely 
fault–2 state (G0 (FALUT–2 = 1), as is shown in Figure 6, 
Figure 7. 
In the case of given evidence that G0 is completely 
fault state (G0 = FALUT-1 or G0 = FALUT-2), all 
conditional probabilities for component nodes can be 
calculated.  
Through analysis when system is in fully FAULT-1 
state, the most influential factor is the Tra7 with failure 
probability (0.2753). When the system is in fully FAULT-2 
state, the greatest impact factor is Pump2MechF 
node with failure probability (0.1387) as shown in Table 
4. 
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Table 4 The failure probability of each component when system top node (TE) fault 
 
Component 
node 
Tra2 Sin0 Sou0 
Fault -1 Fault -2 Fault -1 Fault -2 Fault -1 Fault -2 
 
G0 (Fault -1) 
 
8.18E-5 
 
2.15E-7 
 
6.76E-2 
 
4.0E-4 
 
9.8E-3 
 
3.3E-3 
G0 (Fault -2) 3.3E-6 3.01E-7 9.6E-3 1.7E-3 3.49E-2 4.0E-4 
Component 
node 
Bal3 Sto0 CWaterSouF 
Fault -1 Fault -2 Fault -1 Fault -2 Fault -1 Fault -2 
G0 (Fault -1) 0.1324 9.0E-4 1.6E-3 1.63E-5 2.21E-5 1.02E-5 
G0 (Fault -2) 1.93E-2 3.7E-3 2.0E-4 1.61E-6 2.19E-6 1.47E-6 
Component 
node 
Tra7 Pump1MechF Sou4 
Fault -1 Fault -2 Fault -1 Fault -2 Fault -1 Fault -2 
G0 (Fault -1) 0.2753 3.0E-3 5.07E-2 0.2755 7.7E-3 8.85E-5 
G0 (Fault -2) 3.99E-2 3.0E-4 0.2499 3.33E-2 2.24E-2 3.0E-4 
Component 
node 
Tra11 Sou1 Bar0 
Fault -1 Fault -2 Fault -1 Fault -2 Fault -1 Fault -2 
G0 (Fault -1) 3.7E-3 2.0E-4 8.31E-5 2.56E-7 8.01E-5 6.93E-7 
G0 (Fault -2) 1.39E-2 7.0E-4 2.38E-6 1.95E-6 3.51E-6 1.75E-6 
Component 
node 
HwaterSouF Tra12 Sto1 
Fault -1 Fault -2 Fault -1 Fault -2 Fault -1 Fault -2 
G0 (Fault -1) 4.96E-2 1.5E-3 2.88E-2 5.0E-4 3.0E-4 1.6E-6 
G0 (Fault -2) 0.1466 8.2E-3 0.1493 8.2E-3 8.0E-4 8.12E-6 
Component 
node 
Sou6 Tra16 Pump2MechF 
Fault -1 Fault -2 Fault -1 Fault -2 Fault -1 Fault -2 
G0 (Fault -1) 5.06E-2 1.0E-4 7.7E-3 1.6E-3 6.54E-2 3.81E-2 
G0 (Fault -2) 3.4E-3 3.0E-4 1.21E-2 1.0E-4 0.2433 0.1387 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tra16Sou6
Obj2
Pump2MechF
Tra13
Obj1
Bar0
HWaterSurF
Sto1Tra12
Sou5
TubeSideEF
Tra6
Sou2
Sou1
Obj4
CWaterSouF
Sto0
Tra7
Sou3
Bal0
Sin0
G0
Tra2
Sou0
Bal3
Obj0
Pump1MechFObj3
Tra8
Sou4 Tra11
 
79.49 – Fulfilled
7.23 – Fault -1
16.28 – Fault -2
100.00 – Normal
6.48E-4 – Highflow
6.48E-6 – Lowflow
97.27 – Normal
2.70 – Highflow
0.03 – Lowflow
99.32 – Normal
0.65 – Highvol
0.03 – Lowvol
76.89 –  Normal
6.62    –    Fill
16.49 –  leak
97.27 – Normal
0.08– Highvol
2.65 – Lowvol 97.04 – Normal
2.81 – Highvol
0.15 – Lowvol
100.00 – Normal
3.8E-6 – Highflow
2.0E-7 – Lowflow
87.16 – True
11.95 – Fault -1
0.61 – Fault -2
97.06 – True
2.43 – Fault -1
0.52 – Fault -2
97.22 – Normal
1.11 – Fault -1
11.66 – Fault -2
100.00 – Normal
6.48E -4 – High
3.4E -5 – Low
92.25 – Normal
7.14 – Highflow
0.61 – Lowflow
92.87 – Normal
4.54 – High
2.59 – Low
99.29 – True
0.24 – Fault -1
0.47 – Fault -2
99.73 – Normal
0.26 – Highflow
0.01 – Lowflow
99.56 – Normal
0.43 – Highvol
6.48E-3 – Lowvol
100.00 – Normal
6.48E-4 – Highvol
3.4E-5 – Lowvol
99.98 – Normal
0.02 – Highvol
1.47E-4 – Lowvol
94.41 – Normal
2.76 – Highvol
2.83 – Lowvol
97.04 – Normal
2.81 – Highvol
0.15 – Lowvol
97.27 – Normal
2.70 – Highflow
0.03 – Lowflow
99.98 – Normal
0.02 – Highvol
1.47E-4 – Lowvol
99.56 – Normal
0.43 – Highvol
6.48E-3 – Lowvol
99.73 – Normal
0.26 – Highflow
0.01 – Lowflow
92.87 – Normal
4.54 – High
2.59 – Low
99.29 – True
0.24 – Fault -1
0.47 – Fault -2
99.32 – Normal
0.65 – Highvol
0.03 – Lowvol
98.64 –  Normal
1.30    –    Fill
0.07 –  leak
88.03 – Normal
6.13 – Fault -1
5.84 – Fault -2
88.57 – True
6.13 – Fault -1
5.29 – Fault -2
92.25 – Normal
5.10 – Highflow
2.64 – Lowflow
100.00 – Normal
2.00E-4 – Highvol
1.00E-4 – Lowvol
 
 
Figure 5 The Bayesian network of “the heat exchanger pilot plant” using the intermediate nodes  
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Figure 6   Posterior probability of each node when TE = FALUT - 1 
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Figure 7   Posterior probability of each node when TE = FALUT - 2  
 
 
6.0  CONCLUSION 
 
A multi-state functional model based on MFM that has 
been transformed into an equivalent BN model has 
been used for fault detection and diagnosis in a heat 
exchanger pilot plant. Qualitative analyses have 
been represented by causal dependency graph 
(CDG) and failure probabilities of the root nodes as a 
quantitative analysis has been applied in a heat 
exchanger pilot plant. The results show the strength of 
this approach and can be considered as a useful 
strategy for dealing with complex chemical 
processes. 
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